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ABSTRACT 
Return on major capital investments in petroleum and petro­
chemical facilities, both on and offshore, frequently depends on 
timely startup and long term reliability of major mechanical 
equipment systems. In recent years, operating company ma­
chinery specialist engineers have taken an active role in vendor 
quality assurance to achieve these two objectives. Chevron's 
Corporate Engineering Mechanical Systems Division de­
veloped a successful program to ensure quality in such critical 
machinery. 
Five major steps are included: 
• Vendor prequalification-which vendors have proven 
themselves? 
• Comprehensive specifications-complete, but understand-
able. 
• Design auditing-will the machine be suitable? 
• Manufacturing quality surveillance--build it right. 
• Intensive factory testing-prove that the system works. 
The early history, evolution, and current procedures Chevron 
uses are reviewed. The results from several large projects are 
presented. The economics of the program are reviewed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Corporate Engineering Department (CED) of Chevron 
Corporation is responsible for project design and construction 
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management on major facilities for the company (Figure 1). This 
project slate includes both onshore and offshore facilities such as 
refineries, chemical plants, gas and liquid pipelines, gas plants, 
mining, geothermal, and civil works. 
Figure 1. Chevron Engineering Department Function. 
A second role of CED is direct technical consultation to 
Chevron's operating facilities. This counsel covers a wide range 
from major conversions of current equipment, failure trouble­
shooting and plant-wide energy conservation, to five-minute 
pieces of advice. 
A third function of CED is developing software, such as 
specifications, computer programs, manuals for design of vari­
ous facilities and contracts. CED serves as a center for internal 
and external technical communication, maintaining contact 
with a wide range of vendors, design contractors, consultants 
and other petrochemical companies. 
The Mechanical Systems Division (MSD) of the Corporate 
Engineering Department has the following principal objectives 
(Figure 2): 
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Figure 2. Mechanical Systems Division. 
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• Provide consultation for purchase of pump, turbine, com­
pressor, gear, engine and gas turbine systems which enable on­
time startup and safe, reliable operation. Production losses from 
delays in initial startup can be extremely costly. MSD's number 
one objective is putting a system in the field which will work 
properly the first time it is called upon. 
• Lend technical and hands-on assistance to every operating 
area of the corporation, worldwide. This could involve improve­
ments to existing equipment, field performance tests, upgrades, 
solving minor problems and analyzing catastrophic breakdowns. 
• Develop acceptable vendor lists for all categories of me­
chanical equipment. 
• Prepare all specifications, audit new machinery designs, 
develop and administer quality assurance for manufacturing and 
conduct factory or field testing programs. 
• Participate in industry committees to develop standards 
and to share technology. The primary activity is with the 
American Petroleum Institute (API) Subcommittee for Mechan­
ical Equipment. This subcomittee writes the internationally 
recognized API Standards on pumps, turbines, and other oil and 
gas industry machinery. These standards have been adopted by 
several other industries. 
• Disseminate technical information throughout the corpora­
tion. People call from all over the company asking for help with 
problems or for experienced references from other company 
facilities or other vendors, contractors and consultants. 
EARLY HISTORY OF CHEVRON'S QUALITY 
ASSURANCE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (QASP) 
Twenty or thirty years ago, purchasing mechanical equipment 
systems was totally different from today. In those historical days, 
buying a large centrifugal compressor with a steam turbine 
driver, for example, was essentially just application engineer­
ing. The vendors were told what the process requirements 
were-flow, pressure, gravity, etc. Once the machine was 
purchased, the buyer more or less forgot about everything 
except piping and foundation details. When the machinery 
system was delivered, it would be installed, debugged, some­
times modified, and would normally run quite well for an 
acceptable period of time. 
The early application of centrifugal compressors in 
straightforward services demonstrated that these machinery 
systems were very reliable. They were conservatively designed, 
carefully built and featured thoughtful redundancy in auxiliary 
systems, such as lube oil and seal oil. But machinery was 
becoming expensive. This demonstrated reliability, coupled 
with high cost, convinced most operators that redundancy was 
no longer vital for these critical machinery trains. While it had 
been common practice for years to use installed spare pumps 
and reciprocating compressors, the industry discovered it could 
manage with single, non-redundant centrifugal compressor 
trains (Figure 3). 
The rude awakening came when infant mortality problems 
with such unspared machinery systems caused expensive delays 
in process plant startups. Even in those days, when a plant 
might earn only $10,000 per day, forced outages or delayed 
startups could cost many times the machinery's purchase price 
(Figure 4). Process designs were pushing machinery toward 
higher pressures and higher power density, making even more 
demands on performance and reliability. Large ammonia plants, 
for example, were built with unspared, 30,000 hp steam turbine­
driven centrifugal compressors. 
Major breakdowns, especially during the first year of opera­
tion, began to become more and more common. Costs mounted. 
About fifteen years ago, several major oil companies jointly 
developed a way of looking at these failures to determine what 
Figure 3. Centrifugal Compressor Train. 
Figure 4. Wrecked Steam Thrbine Rotor. 
was causing them. Two indices were developed-the Incident 
Index and the Delay Index-both based upon the number and 
duration of shutdowns which occurred during the first year of 
plant operation (Figure 5 and Figure 6). When this data was 
analyzed, it was found that vendor error accounted for more than 
two-thirds of the big problems. The biggest single factor was 
design mistakes. A second major problem was the lack of 
manufacturing quality control (Figure 7). Subsequent evalua­
tion showed that many of the problems were caused by com­
munication lapses internally to the manufacturer, or between 
the user and the manufacturer. 
Based on this analysis, Chevron started to plan for avoiding 
these problems in future projects. The first emphasis was on 
auditing the detailed design of major equipment before it was 
built. Manufacturing quality assurance surveillance came later. 
M EETING THE NEED 
One of the first steps in preparing to eliminate expensive 
machinery failures was increasing the seniority and field experi­
ence level for CED's Mechanical System Division engineers. 
Today, the division personnel average industry experience level 
is more than seventeen years. 
MSD became heavily involved in working with the manufac­
turers to correct design and manufacturing problems with failed 
equipment in Chevron plants. Through this problem-solving 
work, basic design factors such as critical speeds and blade 
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Figure 5. Major Machinery Failure Index. 
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Figure 6. Major Machinery Downtime Index. 
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Figure 7. Causes of Machinery Problems. 
stresses were understood. Many of the field problems resulted 
from excessive rotor vibration. In some cases, this was because 
the machines ran too close to the natural frequencies of the 
rotor-frame system. Another common difficulty, especially in 
steam turbines, was high-cycle fatigue blade failures. 
On-line analysis of vibration spectra using noncontacting 
probe systems gave the first view of what was actually happening 
inside a high rotating speed machine. It certainly was not clear, 
however, what all the vibration information meant (Figure 8). 
Gradually, over a period of years, machinery specialists began 
to replace the trial and error solutions of major field problems 
with technical analysis. The objective was to determine what 
caused the failure, and fix it right the first time. 
Another development of those early years was engagement of 
third party consultants. These experts were usually mathemat­
icians or former machinery designers. The industry found that 
some of these people could really augment their own experience 
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Figure 8. Cascade Spectrum Analysis of Rotor Displacement 
during Start-Up. 
and knowledge in helping to solve machinery problems. The 
consultants were especially useful in looking at rotordynamics 
and turbine blade stresses. Later, other engineers and scien­
tists, skilled in design and troubleshooting of hydrodynamic 
bearings, gears, pressure casings and foundations, were used. 
Success in solving these field problems became fairly routine. 
And a great deal was learned about what were the typical causes 
of major machinery breakdown. That knowledge was put to use 
by auditing the design of newly purchased, multistage turbines 
and centrifugal compressors. Turbine blade design was the first 
major target. The audit made sure that in the operating range, 
major excitation of blade resonances was avoided. This program 
was quite successful. 
The operators weren't really trying to design the equipment 
for the manufacturer. They were just making sure that all of the 
planned operating conditions, with their resultant stresses, 
were adequately covered in the design. It's true that this review 
forced additional conservatism into the design of machine 
elements such as steam turbine blades, but the increased costs 
were well worth it when viewed against the financial impact of 
lost operating time. 
During these early phases of design auditing, the operators 
faced many arguments. Almost every manufacturer resisted 
incursions into their "proprietary information." 
In the mid-1970s, manufacturing quality became a concern. 
For a period of several years, the oil business had not been 
buying much machinery. A number of manufacturers had cut 
back and and laid workers off. There was concern about the 
adequacy of the remaining staff to build good machines for an 
expected upsurge in refinery plant construction. 
A NEW APPROACH 
Chevron's Mechanical Systems Division developed the Qual­
ity Assurance Surveillance Program (QASP). This program was 
first applied to multistage steam turbines and centrifugal com­
pressors for a major upgrade of a Southern California refinery. 
Just after order placement, Chevron engineers met with the 
vendor and agreed on what manufacturing areas were going to 
be looked at. The approach would be quality surveillance, not 
witnessing. This activity would be in addition to the normal 
witness-hold points such as hydrotesting, where a representa­
tive of the purchasing department was always given several days 
advance notice to be on hand. The surveillance people would 
very carefully check on critical machining, assembly, and bal­
ance operations. It was up to the QASP man to be at the factory 
at the right time--no advance notice and no stopping of 
production. 
There was a great deal of hand wringing and soul searching in 
the early days. Many manufacturers strongly resisted this new 
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approach. They claimed that putting this surveillance man in 
their plant would interfere with the orderly progress of work 
through the shops. A few manufacturers, however, acceded 
readily to this new procedure. 
Chevron started witnessing major equipment factory accept­
ance tests with MSD engineers. In the early days, there were 
many test stand arguments. Frequently, the acceptance parame­
ters were poorly defined. Occasionally, it was a matter of opinion 
whether a machine met the requirements of the order and 
whether or not it was acceptable. Many delays were caused by 
rejection of equipment that vibrated excessively, had oil leaks, 
or did not perform as promised for such parameters as flow, 
pressure and efficiency. 
The next major step was vendor prequalification. Up until 
that time, Chevron's list of vendors had simply grown through 
years of experience. The process of adding vendors and taking 
them out was somewhat haphazard. Chevron adopted the 
philosophy that only vendors who were known to be fully 
capable of building that particular equipment item would be 
asked to bid. The principle was that the products of any 
manufacturer that asked to bid, and responded with an offer that 
met our specifications, could he purchased. 
THE FIVE-PART PROGHAM 
The Chevron system now consists of five individual hut linked 
pmts. These are listed in the order they arc applied: vendor 
prequalification, comprehensive specifications, design audit­
ing, manufacturing quality surveillance, and intensive fi1etory 
testing. 
Vendor Prequalification 
Vendor prequalification is used by Chevron Purchasing and 
MSD to determine which vendors have successfully demon­
strated they know how to design, build, test, and ship a system 
to meet all requirements for the installation (lltble 1). Chevron 
experience and the experience of other companies accessed 
through user lists is analyzed to make these determinations. The 
quality of field service and spare parts backup are also con­
sidered important. Chevron MSD developed a formalized 
program which requires that the vendor demonstrate ability to 
meet specifications and prove that he has successfully built, 
installed, and has running, equipment which is similar .to what 
the company plans to buy. 
Comprehensive Specifications 
Comprehensive specifications are used to ensure that project 
requirements are clearly stated and not subject to misinterpreta­
tion by the vendor or his subvendors. Commercial, along with 
technical items, must be understood and agreed upon. As with 
the specifications of most large oil companies, Chevron specifi-
cations have become more and more bulky. The number of pages 
when combining the Chevron specification and the API Stan­
dard for Centrifugal Compressors, as an example, are consider­
ably greater than they were a few years ago. 1Jnfortunately, the 
oil industry has used its specifications as historical documents 
which defend against all of the difficulties previously experi­
enced. This approach is based on the philosophy, "It shall never 
happen again!" 
Design Auditing 
Design auditing is used to be sure that the machinery system 
is designed to safely and reliably handle all specified operating 
conditions for the required operating life. Materials, stresses, 
resonance, bearing loads, deflections, and performance param­
eters must be accurately predicted and reviewed in detail. In 
some cases, Chevron uses consultants to augment the MSD 
staff's knowledge. 
Some of the most critical items for review are turbine blade 
vibration and gear tooth loadings. Every stage of a multistage 
steam turbine blading (Figure 9) is reviewed, using such 
graphical displays as Campbell diagrams (Figure 10), which 
relate blade natural vibratory frequencies to vane passing and 
rotational exciting frequencies, and Goodman diagrams (Figure 
11), which relate the blade's steady and cyclic stresses at 
resommce to the blade's material properties. Is any row of 
blading in resonance during any part of the operation? If it is in 
resonance, how high will the stresses be? Can these be tolerated 
indefinitely? Great care is taken to be sure that the data used by 
the manufacturer to estimate blade stresses and imposed loads is 
based on solid emperical and analytical knowledge. Gears have 
been one of the real weak points in major machinery trains. 
However, with the use of a mueh more conservative API Gear 
Standard and a thorough design review by one or two consul­
tants, Chevron has been able to affect the elimination of most 
gear failures caused by poor design (1able 2). 
Manufacturing Quality Surveillance 
Manufacturing quality surveillance helps ensure that the 
machinery system parts arc f;tbricated from the conect mate­
rials, within specified fits and finishes, properly assembled, 
balanced, piped and wired. Usually, machinery specialists are 
employed to cover these areas. Selection of the right people for 
this job is extremely important. Not just anyone should be used 
as a quality surveillance person. They must understand machin­
ing and how parts should be properly assembled. They must be 
able to have good working relationships with the manufacturers' 
people to avoid antagonism. The surveillance person should be 
capable of writing informative, periodic status reports. They 
must understand that their role is to get a good machine 
shipped. It is not to keep a machine hung up in the factory. 
Table 1. Master Vendor List. Pumps and Turbine Drivers Pumps, Centrifugal-Heavy Duty Services, EG-983, API 610. 
Single Multi-Stage Vert. 
Stage Vert. Hi Press Slurry C antileverecl Horiz. 
Horiz. Inline and and Vert. Shaft Type Cooling 
Vendor Process Process Boiler FW Pipeline Sulfur Turbine Sump Tower 
A X(l7) X(U) X(l9) X X X 
B X(3) X(ll)(l8) X X X 
c X 
D X 
E X X(ll) X(20) X 
F X(lO) X 
Note: Parenthetical numbers indicate vendor limitation or special requirement included in quotation request. 
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Figure 9. Multistage Steam Turbine Rotor. 
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Figure 11. Typical Goodman Diagram. 
Chevron has had good luck using people from its refinery and 
chemical plant machine shops. Also, retired machine shop 
foremen and a few consultants who have spent a lifetime in 
machinery manufacturing and servicing have worked out well. 
Intensive Factory Testing 
Intensive factory testing prior to shipment will demonstrate 
that the equipment is mechanically sound and performing as 
specified. The tests on critical equipment must be very rigor­
ous. It is extremely important that problems are discovered and 
corrected before shipment. This is especially true for equipment 
that is going offshore or to hostile environments like the North 
Table 2. Tooth Service Stress Calculations. 
Item 
Horsepower/Mesh 
(50% load split assumed) 
Pinion cpm 
Pinion Pitch Diameter 
W, = 
126,050 P 
NP ·d 
Effective Face 
Gear Ratio 
Tooth Contact W,[M!\+1] 
Stress Index F.·d·Mg 
Overload Factor 
Mounting Factor 
Allowable contact stress 
Index 
Sc X 10-42 2.03 
=---X --
C, Co ·Cm 
Symbol 
p 
NP 
d 
w, 
F. 
Mg 
K 
Co 
em 
K. 
K, 
Hardness 
180 
200 
220 
240 
260 
280 
300 
320 
340 
360 
First 
Reduction 
850 
504 
23.25 
9 143 
10.25 
1.14 
75.4 
1.25 
1.30 
Sc X w-42 
1.25 
-c-,
Scxl0-42 
-c-,
67 
76 
83 
92 
101 
108 
116 
126 
137 
147 
Second 
Reduction 
850 
446 
16.5 
14,560 
14.25 
2.894 
83.3 
1.25 
1.30 
SeX 10-4 
1.25 -c-,
K, 
84 
95 
104 
115 
126 
135 
145 
158 
171 
184 
Slope oil production facilities in Alaska. Field rework for 
problem correction is time-consuming and very expensive to the 
operator in terms of repair costs and lost production. 
Every centrifugal compressor, even if it's an identical one of a 
set, is aerodynamically tested for Chevron MSD according to 
the ASME Power Test Code No. 10. For critical, high pressure 
centrifugal compressors, such as those used for natural gas 
injection, testing at full pressure and full horsepower, and 
sometimes with the specified gas, may be required (Figure 12). 
These tests can cost from two hundred thousand dollars to one 
million dollars. It is necessary to develop an economic justifica­
tion for expensive testing. Usually MSD makes recommenda­
tions about spending this much test money on the basis of the 
machine's design, how well proven is it, how likely is it to be 
unstable at high pressures and high speeds, and how much will 
the company lose if the plant doesn't start up and operate on 
time. 
It is extremely difficult in some cases, and very time­
consuming, to make major design changes and corrections in the 
Figure 12. Centrifugal Compressor Testing. 
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field. Another point to remember is that having a spared 
machine does not always help. If you have two identical but 
incorrectly designed compressors, neither one of them is going 
to work properly. 
Meaningful tests take a great deal of planning. The test 
procedures and acceptance parameters should not only be fully 
developed, but well documented ahead of time. The test stand 
crew should be aware of what they are going to do and what will 
be acceptable before the test starts. This avoids arguments and 
delays at the test stand. 
EXAMPLES FROM RECENT M AJOR PROJECTS 
Several years ago, Chevron carried out a 1. 25 billion dollar 
major upgrade of one of its refineries. Setting up the Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Program for this megaproject took a 
great deal of planning. As in any other endeavor, the first and 
most important task was getting the right people. The quality 
assurance effort used an organization structure which reported 
directly to the project manager (Figure 13). Not only were 
inspectors and quality surveillance people used, but, because 
there were so many manufacturers involved, monitors were 
needed to travel around and check on inspection performance 
from time to time. 
I QASP I 
PROJECT ELECTRICAL 
MANAGER EQUIPMENT 
CONSULTANT 
I I LARGE MOTORS SUPERVISOR a GENERATORS I 
SPECIALISTS 
I 
I STEAM Ill RECIPROCATING I I MULTI-STAGE :I PUMPS a HYDRAULIC TURBINES COMPRESSORS TURBINES 
I CENTRIFUGAL I I RECIPROCATING J COMPRESSORS PUMPS 
Figure 13. Quality Assurance Surveillance Program. 
The organization plan for this major project worked with 
reasonable effectiveness. On smaller projects, the system can be 
a lot simpler. But in any project, administration ofQASP should 
come right from the top. Obtaining good quality in manufactur­
ing cannot be a secondary objective. This was graphically 
demonstrated in this major project. Equipment which was 
subjected to the quality assurance program came to the field, 
almost without exception, ready to install and start up. Almost 
without exception, it performed very well. On the other hand, 
dozens of items of minor equipment such as single-stage 
centrifugal pumps were not given the QASP treatment and 
could not be installed. They had connection flanges which were 
damaged. They had shafts which could not be turned. They had 
baseplates which could not be properly aligned. Many of these 
pumps had to be returned to the manufacturer's factories for 
correction. 
A significant problem in a recent Chevron project was with 
several large, critical, multistage centrfugal pumps and hydrau­
lic turbines. These machines were 3500 hp and 4000 hp, 3600 
cpm units with double casings. There were severe and signifi­
cant manufacturing problems. Incorrect materials were used. 
Internals would not fit into casings. Severe rubs occurred during 
factory testing. Numerous reworks, some essentially amounting 
to complete remachining, were required on these pumps before 
they were finally shipped. Chevron's quality assurance surveil­
lance man worked many months and spent countless hours 
helping the manufacturer find and correct the problems. This 
surveillance included four integral steps: 
Witnessing thermal transient (rapid heat up and rapid cool 
down) test at rated flow. Pump flow, suction pressure, and 
discharge pressure shall be recorded. In addition, vibration, 
pump suction temperature, thrust bearing temperature, and 
pump casing temperature shall be continuously recorded for the 
duration of the test. 
Witnessing or observing four-hour mechanical test at mini­
mum continuous flow. Pump flow, pressures, power, speed, 
filtered and unfiltered vibration, lube oil temperature and 
pressure, and bearing temperatures shall be recorded at 15-
minute intervals during the first hour, and at 30-minute inter­
vals for the duration of the test. 
Witnessing or observing start/stop integrity tests, consisting 
of a minimum of 15 starts and stops. Vibration, coastdown time, 
horsepower, suction pressure, and discharge pressure shall be 
recorded. Successive starts and stops shall demonstrate that no 
metal transfer or dimensional changes occur at close running 
clearance in the pump. 
Witnessing or observing complete unit test consisting of 
pump, gear (if any), driver, and auxiliaries. The gear vibration 
on the test shall not exceed 0. 15 ips (inch per second) peak 
unfiltered or 0. 10 ips filtered at any gearbox rotating speed. 
Rigorous factory testing, including an unusual multiple start­
stop test to prove that mated running parts were not galling, was 
used to be sure that the pumps and turbines were right prior to 
shipment. Eventually, they were. They have been operating 
without trouble since 1983. 
The design audit for a 10000 hp horizontally split centrifugal 
compressor (Figure 14) indicated this machine was going to be 
sensitive to unbalance going through its first critical resonance 
(Figure 15). Chevron raised an objection to the manufacturer. 
However, he showed test stand data for very similar machines 
which indicated that all would be satisfactory. The explanation 
was that his rotordynamics computer program tended to exag­
gerate the response of the rotor. When frrst tested, the machine 
performed just as the computer program had predicted. When 
opened after testing, rubbing of the rotor and internals was 
discovered. The actual internal damage indicated that his 
computer program was right. 
We soon found out what was wrong. The vibration probes on 
the earlier machines had been installed very close to nodal 
points on the shaft-that is, points of little or no shaft motion. 
Chevron specifications had required that our probes be located 
just a few inches along the shaft away from nodal points outboard 
of the bearings. 
Figure 14. Large Horizontally-Split Centrifugal Compressor. 
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Figure 15. Centrifugal Compressor Design Audit. 
Many attempts were made to solve this problem without 
success. We found that the impeller mounting design on the 
shaft was not adequate. As the machine came up to speed, the 
impellers shifted and ruined the good balance that the rotor had 
when it left the high speed balancing machine. Since it was a 
long rotor with not much damping at the bearings, a high 
response occurred going through the critical, causing the rubs. 
Also, we found that the older, successful compressors all used oil 
lubed seals. Our labyrinth seals did not provide some needed 
damping. 
Eventually, the solution was found. A new shaft forging was 
made along with improvements to the design of the shaft and 
impellers. The assembly and balancing procedures were altered 
so that the rotor would stay in balance as it ran up and down in 
speed. 
High pressure, double case, multistage centrifugal com­
pressors must have reliable thrust bearings. In this example, the 
manufacturer was going to use a thrust bearing design of his own 
(Figures 16). This was discovered during the design audit and 
found to be satisfactory. Later, when the compressor was being 
assembled, the quality assurance surveillance man noticed that 
the actual thrust bearing was not the same as the one we had 
agreed upon during the design audit. Chevron's contractor 
called a stop to manufacturing. 
The thrust bearing was a different design and had never been 
adequately tested. In order to solve this problem without being 
arbitrary, a mutually agreed upon third party bearing design 
consultant was hired. He reviewed the design and firmly 
concluded that it was not adequate and was probably going to 
allow in-operation thrust bearing failures. It was necessary to 
stop production, revert to the bearing which was originally 
approved, remanufacture the shafts, and change the bearing 
housings. Chevron required the manufacturer to do all of this 
before we would allow shipment. An operational thrust bearing 
Figure 16. T hrust Bearing. 
failure in a high pressure centrifugal compressor can result in 
total disaster. 
In order to qualify manufacturers of large gas turbine electric 
generating sets for an upcoming cogeneration project, CED 
engineers traveled around the world. They visited plants for gas 
turbine manufacturing, gear manufacturing, electronic control 
systems, and electric generators, looking at their capabilities 
and checking into their experience. They visited several in­
operation cogeneration systems using similar equipment. 
Operating history and their startup and installation experi­
ences were reviewed. This review allowed Chevron to establish 
an acceptable vendor list for the project. Whichever of the 
manufacturers is chosen, he will be able to provide a proven, 
satisfactory system. 
QUALITY ECONOMICS 
Process plant startup delays are expensive. Thirty years ago, a 
refinery process plant might earn $10,000 per day. Now, for 
major plants, $100,000 to $250,000 per day earning power is not 
unusual. Still, major turbomachinery is typically not redundant. 
For a compressor train costing a million dollars as the heart of a 
plant that earns a quarter of a million dollars per day, it doesn't 
take too long to justify a full-blown quality assurance program. 
Chevron has been doing quality assurance surveillance for 
about fifteen years, and the costs are well documented. The 
costs vary, depending upon the manufacturer and the complexi­
ty of the equipment. A typical range is two or three percent of 
the capital outlay for the machinery train (Figure 17). For a 
million dollar train, even if the exra cost for quality assurance 
surveillance, testing and design auditing is $50,000 or $100,000, 
saving one day's operation can quickly pay it out. 
It must be kept in mind that quality assurance and factory 
testing may delay shipment. That does not necessarily delay 
Quality Assurance Program Costs 
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plant startup. For major turbomachinery, it is not uncommon for 
the equipmebnt train to be in place in the field for six to eighteen 
months before the plant actually begins operation (Figure 18). If 
the equipment hasn't been adequately checked during manu­
facturing and tested prior to shipment, it could be a time bomb 
ticking. All of that time while the machinery sits waiting in the 
plant is wasted. The latent problems manifest themselves when 
startup comes, or later, when try ing to reach full capacity. 
Chevron's approach takes advantage of that lead time by being 
sure the equipment is right before it is installed. Consider the 
example of the multistage double case pumps. Delay s in 
shipment ranged as high as fourteen months for those pumps. 
However, this was a large, complex project and, in spite of this 
delay, the plant actually started up two months early. The pumps 
all worked when Chevron needed them. 
Shipment Delays 
From Promised Shipment in $1.2 5 Billion Project 
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Figure 18. Major Equipment Shipment Delays. 
The cost/benefit ratio for the Mechanical Sy stems Division 
Quality Program is now very well proven in the company, 
especially for large complex projects. Chevron's Engineering 
Department project managers insist on having the program. it 
has not been as well demonstrated for smaller projects and in 
some areas of work such as offshore platforms. However, the day 
is approaching when this will be the common meffi<>d for buy ing 
major equipment for any project. 
FUTURE OUTLOOK 
Our manufacturers have begun to appreciate Chevron's criti­
cal need for well-built, reliable products, delivered on time and 
in working condition, and the fact that we're willing to pay for 
this. They have started programs aimed at satisfying these 
needs. We are now asking equipment builders to submit fully 
developed quality assurance plans which detail all inspection 
and control steps. Eventually, strict compliance with their own 
programs may obviate the need to impose the Chevron manu­
facturing surveillance approach. 
The company will continue actively looking for better means 
to obtain machinery sy stems which fully meet its needs. We 
want to do this in a manner which allows our suppliers to make a 
fair profit. We need them to be in business and to be financially 
healthy. \Ve are try ing to learn to communicate our needs even 
better and to work successfully with the manufacturers to 
achieve this mutually beneficial objective. 
SUMMARY 
The history, development, current status and operation of the 
Chevron Corporation Quality Assurance Program for major 
mechanical equipment has been presented. How Chevron's 
problems started and how important non-redundant equipment 
started to break down has been discussed. The development of 
the Incident Index and Delay Index analy sis focused attention 
on first, design errors, and then, manufacturing problems. Next 
explained was how quality awareness was developed, through 
solving problems in the field, and on our own and using 
consultants, learning about what was important in machinery 
design, developing the Quality Assurance Program, witnessing 
tests with skilled people, and limiting vendors to those who are 
really qualified-all important parts of the five-part program. 
Examples were cited from a number of major projects about 
setting up a quality assurance program, design auditing, testing 
and vendor qualification. Hopefully, it's been demonstrated that 
the economics are there to support this kind of a program, 
especially for large projects. 
There are many hopeful signs that things are improving. But 
even for manufacturers who are making major steps with 
programs to improve quality, more time will be needed. At least 
five y ears time will be required from when a manufacturer 
completely overhauls his approach to quality, until he can 
achieve these objectives. 
